An Overview of Comparative Environmental Law by Tarlock, A. Dan & Tarak, Pedro
Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 
Volume 13 
Number 1 Fall Article 6 
May 2020 
An Overview of Comparative Environmental Law 
A. Dan Tarlock 
Pedro Tarak 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp 
Recommended Citation 
A. Dan Tarlock & Pedro Tarak, An Overview of Comparative Environmental Law, 13 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 
85 (1983). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital 
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an 
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-
commons@du.edu. 





The recognition of environmental disruption as an issue demanding
political action has become a worldwide phenomenon.1 There is growing
recognition that the continued use of watersheds, land resources and the
atmosphere as sinks for the disposal of human residuals results in unac-
ceptable social costs, such as increased illness, crop losses, ecosystem dis-
ruption and the creation of low-level, long-term health risks such as can-
cer. Moreover, there is a growing societal preference, especially in the
developed nations, for increased amenity levels.2 This preference has led
to demands for greater governmental protection of the natural landscape
from developmental "insults," for the maintenance of a "human scale" in
urban planning and for a greater role for social and aesthetic considera-
tions in developmental planning of all kinds.3
Public health protection and amenity enhancement are often
achieved by either the reduction of residual discharge levels or the pro-
motion of less polluting activities. Environmental problems are present to
some degree in all nations, independent of the political, economic, and
social organization of the country. Pollution and the demand for amenity
enhancement are largely functions of the levels of industrial development
and education, and of the distribution of population within a country. For
example, one can trace the evolution of air and water pollution laws in
* A. Dan Tarlock is Professor of Law at the Illinois Institute of Technology/Chicago-
Kent College of Law.
**Pedro Tarak is Professor of Environmental Policy and Law, Institute of Natural Re-
sources Law, University of Buenos Aires, Argentina.
1. For a comparative survey of environmental issues in four industrialized coun-
tries-Great Britain, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States-which stresses the
differences and similarities in environmental constituencies within and without government,
see, C. ENLOE, THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: ECOLOGY AND
POWER IN FOUR NATIONS (1975).
2. The increased desire for cleaner, more aesthetically pleasing environments has been
noted by all major studies concerned with global resource needs. See, e.g., W. HXFELE, J.
ANDERER, A. McDONALD & N. NACKICENOVIC, ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD: A GLOBAL SYSTEMS
ANALYSIS (1981).
3. In this article, the standard three-part classification of environmental planning and
management objectives has been collapsed into two parts. The three traditional environ-
mental planning objectives are (1) the protection of physical and mental health, (2) the
enhancement of economic value and (3) the preservation of sensory pleasure. See T.
O'RORDAN, ENvIRONMENTALIsM 202 (1976).
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the United States as well as in both Eastern and Western Europe from
general prohibitions against harmful discharges to technology-forcing li-
censing laws that specify the parameters of lawful air and water
emissions."
Despite common environmental problems and similarities among the
institutional responses to environmental degradation and threats to
human health, environmental protection is still primarily the responsibil-
ity of individual sovereign nations. This is true even though regional orga-
nizations, such as the European Economic Community (EEC), are playing
an increasingly active role in policy formulation and coordination.' In the
foreseeable future, however, the persistence of differing economic and po-
litical goals suggests that there will be great variations among nations in
the balances struck between the costs of maintaining environmental qual-
ity and the opportunity costs of achieving this objective.' Some countries
accord greater weight to the benefits of industrial development and
wealth redistribution while others emphasize the benefits of a stable and
healthy environment. These differences manifest themselves in the insti-
tutional structures and legal regimes devised to govern environmental
quality.
This article attempts a brief comparative analysis of the different in-
stitutional responses to the various types of environmental degradation.
The common types of environmental insult which have been the subject
of legislation are initially classified and a model of the evolution of envi-
ronmental strategies is proposed. The general schemes of environmental
regulation utilized in various countries are identified by an examination
of the different institutional arrangements which have been created to
enforce such schemes. The different methods of pollution reduction and
public health protection are compared in order to identify common ap-
proaches and to point out unique features of the methods employed by
the countries surveyed. For the sake of brevity, selected examples from
4. An illustration of this general development can be seen in the evolution of Poland's
water pollution control law from the Water Act of 30 May 1962, Dz V (Pol.), No. 34, at 158,
to the Water Act of 24 October 1974, Dz V (Pol.), No. 74, at 430 (Trybuna Ludu), described
in S. ERCMAN, EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 89-93 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW]. For a more extended discussion of
enviruninuital proLecLiun planning in socialist systems, see Somer, Legal Ways and Means
of Environmental Protection in the Legal System of Industrial Investments in Socialist
Countries, 3 EARTH L.J. 7 (1979).
5. See note 94 infra.
6. Considerable debate exists about the priority to be given to environmental issues in
developing countries. Many of these nations view stringent environmental protection poli-
cies as luxuries they cannot afford or, worse yet, as a plot by the developed nations to per-
petuate the present unequal distribution of wealth throughout the world. For an early expo-
sition of this theme, see Castro, The Case of the Developing Countries, in WORLD
EcoCRISIS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN RESPONSE 237 (D. Kay & E. Skolnikoff eds.
1972). There is some evidence that the attitudes of the developing nations are changing. See
Bassow, The Third World: Changing Attitudes Toward Environmental Protection, 444 AN-
NALS 112 (1979).
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the three major legal systems of the Americas and Europe-the common
law, civil law, and socialist law-will be used to illustrate such approaches
and the impact of differing economic and social priorities on environmen-
tal law. To a lesser extent, the institutional responses to environmental
degradation in countries on the road to development will be explored and,
at the risk of emphasizing common aspects of environmental protection
against the particular circumstances which influence the institutional re-
sponses to demands for environmental quality in a specific country, a
generally applicable model of legal and environmental protection will be
sketched.
II. CATEGORIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL INSULTS AND THEIR LEGAL
CONSEQUENCES
Environmental insults which threaten public health may usefully be
categorized as either episodic or persistent in nature. Different institu-
tional responses are required depending on whether the problem is one of
redressing past harm by compensating victims of isolated incidents or
preventing future risks arising from persistent discharges.
Episodic insults are discrete pollution events occurring on a large or
small scale. An accidental discharge of toxic effluents into a stream that
kills fish and closes recreation areas or an air inversion which traps pollu-
tants over a city for several days or perhaps weeks are typical episodic
insults. The harm done by these discrete insults is measured by short-
term exposure to the pollution. In contrast, persistent insults are more
diffuse and more difficult to measure. They result from continuing, poten-
tially harmful emissions produced by economically valuable activities and
are exemplified by untreated sewage discharges, sulphur dioxide emis-
sions from coal burning facilities, automobile exhausts, low level radiation
emissions, and acid rain. Further complications arise from the potential
irreversibility of such pollution phenomena as acid rain.7
Discrete environmental insults may be further classified into three
types, and legal systems often respond differently to each of these. Harm
from an environmental result may be past, imminent, or long-term and
merely possible. All legal systems permit individuals injured by a discrete
episode of pollution to seek a remedy in damages and, in some instances,
an injunction against an activity which threatens immediate harm." Col-
lective responses, however, are generally required to prevent persistent
pollution since it is this type which often does not go unredressed by indi-
viduals' private actions. As a result, persistent pollution has increasingly
become the subject of administrative regulation, although the regulations
tend to focus on the prevention of measurable, known harms as opposed
7. See G. WETSTONE & A. ROSENCRANZ, ACID RAIN IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA: NA-
TIONAL RESPONSES TO AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM (1983) and I. VAN LIER, ACID RAIN AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1981).
8. See, e.g., BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] arts. 906 & 1004 (W. Ger.).
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to the minimization of serious, persistent, but unquantifiable public
health threats."
An increasingly accepted justification for the regulation of persistent
pollution sources derives from the notion that often no one individual will
suffer sufficient damage to make a threshold showing of injury under ap-
plicable private law doctrines. Even if a number of persons suffering le-
gally cognizable harm were to aggregate their claims so as to give each
more incentive to litigate,10 such incentive would more than likely be in-
sufficient, given the paucity of each individual's potential share of any
recovery.
Perhaps a more powerful justification for regulating activities such as
pesticide use or the discharge of toxic substances into the air, water, or
earth is the fact that those who are involuntarily exposed to the risk of
future ill health often have little or no idea of the dangers of such expo-
sure. While intervention by a government to protect the citizenry from
unwitting exposure to subtle health risks is increasingly accepted, it re-
mains controversial because of the opportunity costs of risk minimization.
Attempts to reduce substantially societal exposure to certain risks will
increase the costs of bringing new products to market and may thus serve
to deprive society of those products' benefits. For this reason, some coun-
tries, such as Japan, emphasize after-the-fact compensation for environ-
mental disasters,1 rather than the prevention of future harm.
In the public mind, the impairment of public health and welfare is
associated with discharges of residuals, commonly described as "pollu-
tion." This appellation gives rise to the normative inference that govern-
ment intervention is justified to reduce or eliminate such discharges.
While there is some basis for using the term "pollution" to refer loosely
to any undesirable concentration of chemicals or particulates, the term is
not truly self-defining. Two reduction goals exist which have sharply dif-
9. One commentator has written of acid rain:
[air pollution] standards are especially ineffective in addressing long range
transport because concern for compliance focuses on ground level concentra-
tions, not on higher altitudes more relevant to the transportation process ....
[Tihe laxity of present standards is largely due to poor documentation of the
health effects associated with exposure to low levels of the pollutants.
^& ~t Ii l r-u&&itto, UU0i i -LUa If -t Ui Ai -MeuibCii. li SC-Jb~
Snow, 10 ENVTL. L. REP., Mar. 1980, at 50001, 50005.
In comparison, U.S. regulation of pesticide use focuses both on the problems of acute
and chronic toxicity in evaluating the safety of various chemical compounds. The primary
focus is on screening out those compounds that present a substantial, but highly probabilis-
tic, risk of producing cancer in persons exposed to pesticide residues. See NATIONAL ACAD-
EMY OF SCIENCES, REGULATING PESTICIDES (1980).
10. See Krier, Environmental Watchdogs: Some Lessons from a "Study" Council, 23
STAN. L. REV. 623 (1971).
11. The 1973 Japanese Law for the Compensation of Pollution-Related Damage: An
Introductory Assessment, 5 ENVTL. L. REP., Dec., 1975, at 50229. See also J. GRESSER, K.
FUGIKURA & A. MORISHIMA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN JAPAN (1981) (discussing the develop-
ment and current status of Japan's environmental law).
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ferent consequences, and the goal chosen by a government controls the
operative definition of "pollution." 2 A conservative goal defines pollution
as any concentration of a substance that degrades the air or a watershed
below its natural background level; in short, the term is defined as any
artificial change. A rational goal, by contrast, defines pollution in terms
of the measurable or assumed costs of degradation. A rational strategy
does not define changes in natural backgound levels as pollution per se.
Rather, it requires that beyond proof of degradation, there must be some
level of aggregate damage beyond proof(?) of degradation, the reduction
of which will yield benefits in excess of the costs of reducing emissions.
The pursuit of a conservative goal, in sum, is equivalent to the imposition
of ambient air standards to eliminate or reduce substantially all known
and unknown risks, whereas the pursuit of a rational goal is tantamount
to following control strategies based on a social cost accounting approach
that stops short of eliminating all discharges.
Since the laws of most countries reflect a tension between conserva-
tive and rational goals, the term "pollution" can only be defined in the
context of specific regulatory programs. Unfortunately, legislatures,
courts and commentators generally do not use the term to describe pre-
cise emission reduction goals. Instead, it is used to refer to any degrada-
tion generally considered intolerable, a usage that obscures the hard
choices involved in formulating any emission reduction strategy. In this
article, however, the term will refer to receiving media content levels that
are in excess of emission levels deemed safe or reasonable by a court or
legislature with respect to the public health or other interests.
Pollution is said to result from historic assumptions that watersheds,
the air and many land resources are, in economic terms, free goods."3
Thus, water, air and land have historically been used without cost as
sinks for the disposal of wastes. In many cases, however, the use of these
resources in such a manner has imposed costs on both present and future
generations.1" Because their ownership has never been clearly defined, no
person or entity could charge for their use for waste disposal purposes.
Disposal costs were not, therefore, internalized by the disposer. As a mat-
ter of economic theory, the costs of waste disposal are no different from
those using other factors of production, such as labor and raw materials,
but these costs have been ignored because there has been no market to
discipline producers' waste production levels.' As a consequence, the
12. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE, Dec. 13, 1968, at 1243.
13. W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, AND THE QUALrrY OF
LIFE 209-16 (1979).
14. Some costs, such as those to human health, are obvious-see L. LAVE & E. SESKIN,
AIR POLLUTION AND HUMAN HEALTH (1975)-but others are more subtle and longterm. See,
e.g., Georgescu-Roegen, The Entropy Law and the Economic Problem, in ECONOMICS, ECOL-
OGY, ETHICS: ESSAYS TOWARDS A STEADY-STATE ECONOMY 49, 57 (H. Daly ed. 1980).
15. For a readable introduction to this literature, see A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, POL-
LUTION, PRICES, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1975).
One conspicuous example of a country's decision to allow the continued free use of
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price system which forced the efficient use of labor and raw materials did
not have the same effect on disposal sinks. The inevitable result of the
free use of natural resources as sinks has been overuse. Such overuse be-
comes a problem for the following reason: whenever an activity (e.g. pol-
lution), free to the market actor, imposes costs (e.g. health problems), the
market or market substitute will not guarantee the proper allocation of
resources, with the consequent risk that resources will be inefficiently al-
located. This is the standard explanation of the cause of the "pollution
problem," and it has provided a universally powerful rationale for public
intervention to protect public health. As a reformist rather than a radical
theory, however, such an explanation does not challenge the prevailing
assumption throughout the world that economic development (along with
the provision for national defense) should be given the highest priority by
a country. While this theory suggests only that gross abuses of develop-
ment should be curbed, other more radical theories based on the "les-
sons" of ecology argue that the world must squarely face the fact of lim-
ited resources and decrease its overall consumption levels to ensure
environmental quality and human survival. 6
What follows from the welfare economics approach is a rational pol-
lution strategy, and the laws of many countries, as will be discussed be-
low, are premised on the goal of allocating resources efficiently. Achieving
this goal requires balancing the costs and benefits of pollution reduction.
The notion that the control of pollution is a simple cost-benefit problem,
however, is being increasingly rejected. It is often argued that certain dis-
charges are potentially so harmful that the public should be protected
from them regardless of the opportunity costs of the regulation. 7 Simply
put, rationales for pollution reduction to achieve a conservative goal exist,
apart from improved efficiency.
III. FACTORS INFLUENCING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LEVELS
The desired level of environmental protection and the method of
seeking public health protection and environmental quality enhancement
vary from country to country. Ultimately, a detailed knowledge of each
country's culture, history, and political organization is necessary to un-
derstand fully its environmental laws and policies, but common variables
exist which can be used to predict both the level of environmental protec-
tion and the ,,means choen to reach it Thpgp vnrin lp. can initinlly be
airsheds as sinks was Brazil's environmental policy in the 1970s. The city of Cubat-Wao was
at one point described as the "valley of death" because of high discharges of carbon monox-
ide, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and hydrocarbons from a petrochemical complex, but
the country seemed nonetheless to have accepted the argument that pollution control is a
luxury affordable only by developed countries. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1980, at 3, col. 2.
16. This literature is summarized in Duvall, The Deep Ecology Movement, 20 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 299 (1980).
17. See Rodgers, Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmental
Decisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 191 (1980).
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allocated among four categories: industrialization; political organization;
cultural and ideological values; and public awareness, demand and organi-
zation for governmental action to solve environmental problems, a cate-
gory which cuts across the first three categories but is sufficiently impor-
tant to merit separate discussion.
A. Industrialization
Of necessity, all countries desire economic growth and consequently
pursue or have pursued aggressive industrialization programs. In a few
countries, such as Norway and Sweden, the optimal degree of growth has
been debated politically, but in most countries the need for industrializa-
tion is assumed as an article of faith. Since pollution is caused by, among
other things, the discharge of residuals from industrial and associated ac-
tivities, it is found in all developing as well as developed countries, re-
gardless of political organization or ideology.
B. Political Organization
For environmental policy-making purposes, it may be easier for in-
terests without formal governmental representation to elevate environ-
mental issues to the level of important political questions in democratic
nations than it is in totalitarian regimes. Even though environmental
problems are no less serious in the latter, they are less likely to engage
the attention of the ruling elites, who are usually concerned primarily
with economic, military and internal security matters. 8 The recognition
of environmental interests is often seen as a generally destabilizing
force."
In countries organized on the basis of a federal administrative sys-
tem, a national government with specifically delimited powers governs,
with states or provinces possessing semi-autonomous authority.2" In these
countries, control over natural resources is often considered a state or
provincial, as opposed to a national, function 2' and thus states have con-
siderable discretion to define environmental priorities on self-interest
grounds alone unless the national government intervenes. In the United
States, states competed for industry by allowing lax pollution standards,
but this problem has been dealt with by uniform national standards
which set maximum levels for discharges into the water and air2 2 In con-
trast, Canada's federal system allows the ten provinces to enjoy greater
18. C. ENLOE, supra note 1, at 150.
19. Id.
20. In unitary systems, by contrast, as exemplified by the United Kingdom and France,
subunits of government exist as well, but only as administrative arms of the national gov-
ernment, which has complete authority to dictate policy to them. See G. LEFCOE, LAND DE-
VELOPMENT IN CROWDED PLACES (1979).
21. See Streibl, Environmental Policy in a Federal State, 1 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 13
(1975).
22. See, e.g., The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. I 1977).
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freedom to set nonuniform standards.2"
C. Political Ideology
A country's political ideology influences 1) the effective allocation of
environmental regulatory authority among different units of government,
2) the impetus with which environmental objectives are sought to be
achieved, 3) the division of power between formal institutions and the
public, and 4) the general receptivity of the government to popular pres-
sure for increased environmental protection. Both the Judeo-Christian
foundations of Western liberal democracy and the Marxist-Leninist the-
ory of socialism place man above nature.24 Additionally, both the Western
tradition of individualism and mainstream Marxist ideology and practice
stress the need for man to struggle against nature in order to better him-
self.25 However, two important minority currents in Western think-
ing-the theory of man's stewardship responsibility for preserving the
natural environment, and the theory stemming from the eighteenth-cen-
tury German transcendental idealist, Fichte, that one can only perfect na-
ture by cooperating with it-have proved to be important justifications
for environmental legislation in many Western countries.2 In contrast, it
is argued that in socialist countries with highly centralized bureacracies,
such as the U.S.S.R., the economic, political, and military benefits de-
rived from traditional (socialist) patterns of production far outweigh envi-
ronmental concerns, given-that increased production constitutes the only
acceptable measure of bureaucratic success.2 1 It has also been suggested
that Far Eastern values, which emphasize reverence for nature, animals
and inner self-fulfillment, are more compatible with environmental pro-
tection; however, the Japanese, with their tradition of respect for author-
ity, have allowed post-war governments to establish "industrial growth as
the formula for National happiness"28 and to deflect the rising concern
over the costs of unrestrained industrial development. Still, the anti-ma-
terialistic, spiritual values of grace and restraint in Japanese culture
23. See Weston, note 9 supra. See also Lutz II, The Laws of Environmental Manage-
ment: A Comparative Study, 24 AM. J. Comp. L. 447, 458-59 (1974).
24. See J. PASSMORE, MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE 28-40 (1974).
25. A recent summary of the Western and other views of nature can be found in Calli-
cott, Traditional American Indian and Western European Attitudes Toward Nature: An
Overview, 4 ENVTL. ETHICS 293 (1982).
26. See E. FEDOROV, MAN AND NATURE: THE EcOLOGICAL CRISIS AND SOCIAL PROGRESS
146-47 (1980). What Marx has to say about environmental problems is debated in Lee, To-
ward A Marxian Ecological Ethic: A Response to Two Critics, 4 ENVTL. ETHICS 339 (1982);
Lee, On the Marxian View of the Relationship Between Man and Nature, 2 ENVTL. ETHICS
3 (1980); Routley, On Marx as an Environmental Hero, 3 ENMrL. ETHICS 237 (1981); and
Tolman, Karl Marx, Alienation, and the Mastery of Nature, 3 ENvTL. ETHICS 63 (1981).
27. See Paper presented by Robert W. Clawson at the Conference on Soviet Resource
Management and the Environment at the University of Washington (June 7, 1974) (entitled
Soviet Resource Management: Political Aspects of Water Pollution Control).
28. C. ENLOE, supra note 1, at 178. See also M. REICH, N. HUDDLE & N. STIDSKIN,
ISLAND OF DREAMS, ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS IN JAPAN (1975).
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played some role in the elevation of environmental concerns to a central
political issue in the early 1970s."'
D. Opportunities for Public Influence
In many countries, organized public action has influenced the politi-
cal process by generating debate about environmental problems and their
solutions. The extent to which a political system allows interest groups to
organize and participate in the political process influences responses to
environmental questions. For example, in the United States, the relative
openness of the political system facilitated the quick rise of influential
"public action" groups calling for new regulatory initiatives and allowed
these same groups to secure a prominent place for environmental issues
on the national agenda. In contrast, the relatively closed nature of the
political process in Japan has led to violence in popular expressions of
concern about environmental issues.3
IV. LEGAL STRATEGIES TO CONTROL ENVIRONMENTAL INSULTS
Any pollution control program designed to protect public health
must choose from among limited emission reduction or minimization
strategies. Any country's pollution control program will likely combine el-
ements from all of these strategies, but it is useful to analyze them sepa-
rately due to the different costs and benefits associated with each.
A. Private Actions
Every legal system allows those who suffer injury by living in close
proximity to a pollution source to seek redress. In civil law systems, pri-
vate actions against activities which cause damage to health and property
are based on the theory of abuse of established rights. An abuse occurs
whenever a right is "exercised in a manner contrary to the societal inter-
est,"" and the standard is an objective one. This same concept, i.e., that
law is for the benefit of the community, is expressed by the common law
maxim sic utere ut alienum non laedes (every person should use his own
property so as not to injure that of another), which allows courts to define
the correlative rights of landowners to use their property.3 2 The potential
for private actions to eliminate many environmental harms is limited,
however, because any system of private rights must decide which activi-
ties causing discomfort to others are legal and which are not. Were it oth-
erwise, every activity carried on in connection with land could be poten-
tially tortious. In both the civil law and common law systems, the
29. J. GRESSER, K. FUJIKURA & A. MOmSHIMA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN JAPAN 45 (1981).
30. C. ENLOE, supra note 1, at 180.
31. L. JOSSERAND, DE L'EsPIRIT DES DROITS ET DE LEUR RELATIVrIt: TH.ORIE DITE DE
L'ABUS DES DROITS, cited in F. LAWSON, A. ANTON & N. BROWN, AMOS & WALTON'S INTRO-
DUCTION TO FRENCH LAW (3rd ed. 1967).
32. See R. ELLiCKSON & A. TARLOCK, LAND USE CONTROLS 564-70 (1982).
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granting of damages and specific relief is confined to "abnormal activi-
ties." 8 All systems of landowner rights and remedies are based on the
idea that normal levels of background activities for an area can be deter-
mined and that liability should only attach to those activities which ex-
ceed such levels. However, this standard for landowners' rights has given
courts considerable discretion to balance the costs and benefits of any
given activity. Because only those acts which exceed the normal back-
ground activity of a neighborhood constitute a nuisance, many environ-
mental harms go unredressed-especially those which first manifest
themselves to the sensitive person and those which are only considered
harmful once their cumulative impact is understood.
B. Public Actions
Private actions have been rejected as the sole means of controlling
pollution in many countries because of the technical difficulties of proving
harm and cause in fact, and because of disincentives to organizing suits to
reduce many serious but diffuse sources of pollution.' Still, in some
countries private actions remain an important means of obtaining relieP5
and of bringing regulatory gaps to public attention. 6 In fact, many public
regulatory programs actually rely on private actions for their effective-
ness. For example, the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act in the United
States allow citizens' suits against public officials who fail to carry out
their clearly defined statutory duties or against polluters who violate air
and water quality standards.
3 7
In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a federal common law of
water pollution that allowed direct actions against sources of pollution
that were alleged to cause injury despite compliance with applicable regu-
lations," but subsequently the Court held that comprehensive water pol-
lution control legislation preempted common law actions.39 Similarly, the
Court has also refused to recognize any implied private rights of action
under the pollution statutes.40 In civil law systems, the ability of private
plaintiffs to bring a public action is alien to the more rigid theory that
33. See, e.g., Greek Civil Code arts. 1003-05, reprinted in A. Mastorogamvraki, Envi-
ronmental Protection in Greece, in EUROPEAN ENVIRONmENTAL LAW, supra note 4, at 351.
34. See, e.g., T. Fleiner, Swiss Environmental Law-The Position at April 1976, in Eu-
ROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 4, at 431-32.
35. E.g., Spain's fragmentary law of air and water pollution control is basically a codifi-
cation of the civil law prohibitions against the maintenance of nuisances. Id. at 98-103, 165-
67.
36. A famous articulation of this position worldwide is J. SAx, DEFENDING THE ENVIRON-
MENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION (1971).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. IV 1980); and 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1976).
38. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
39. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. granted 445 U.S.
896 (1980), mem. 449 U.S. 813 (1980).
40. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
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rights must be either public or private.4 By way of exception, however,
such actions brought by recognized nature protection associations have
been allowed by statute in two states in the Federal Republic of
Germany.2
V. PUBLIC REGULATION
A. Environmental Policy Formulation and Expression
As noted above, significant variations exist among countries regard-
ing environmental goals and the means of accomplishing them. Some-
times these goals are expressed directly through substantive legislative
standards that state the weight given to environmental values relative to
other societal values. In other instances, the formal substantive standards
are less important than the means chosen to implement the goals. In gen-
eral, environmental goals and substantive standards are related to the
level of industrial and technological development of a country, while the
regulatory strategies chosen to implement the goals reflect the political,
economic and social organization obtaining there. Prior to the passage of
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969' (NEPA) in the United
States, countries had often devised natural resources use goals in terms of
the optimal level of development of a single resource, with environmental
values being relegated to a position of secondary concern. The early fore-
runners of modern comprehensive pollution control enactments were vari-
ous acts of public health legislation dealing with nuisance-like substances
such as sewage and smoke. A country's environmental policy, if one ex-
isted, was often directed against specific problems, for example, the killer
fog of 1952 in England.4
In 1963, a general model of the evolution of environmental policy was
proposed by Lynton K. Caldwell."" It was argued that environmental pol-
icy is "an outgrowth of the conservation movement, and often still ap-
pears under the names of conservation or natural resources administra-
tion in many countries." 6 This evolution was generally thought to have
three distinct stages: (1) a public awareness of values, as occurred in the
United States between the years 1890-1908; (2) the conservation of spe-
cific resources such as the water, air, soil, or forests;"' and (3) concern
41. See Rehbinder, Controlling the Environmental Enforcement Deficit: West Ger-
many, 24 AM. J. CoMP. L. 373 (1976). Citizens in the Federal Republic of Germany do,
however, have considerable rights to participate in administrative proceedings.
42. Act for the Protection of Nature and Landscape § 44, 1979 [BGBI] 345 (W. Ger.)
and Act for the Protection of Nature and Landscape § 36, [1980] I [GVBIJ 309 (W. Ger.).
See generally P. STORM, UNWELTRECHT (1980).
43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4327 (1970).
44. L. BATTEN, THE UNCLEAN SKY 14 (1966).
45. Caldwell, Environment: A New Focus For Public Policy?, 23 PuB. AD. REv. 132
(1963).
46. L. CALDWELL, MAN AND His ENVIRONMENT. POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION 35 (1976).
47. In the United States, environmental policy was confined to conservation and the
preservation of nature until the late 1950s and early 1960s. See J. PETULLA, AMERICAN ENvI-
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with the totality of man's environmental relationships."'
The method of formulating an environmental policy, as the Caldwell
model indicates, is inevitably piecemeal and leaves many gaps. Generally,
if an agency has no express authority to deal with the environmental as-
pects of a problem, it will not do so until specific legislation forces it to
act." Although some countries continue to address specific gaps with spe-
cific legislation, others have tried to "short circuit" the process by adopt-
ing general policy statements. While policy statements do not, of course,
serve to commit the resources and political will necessary to cope with
environmental problems, they are nonetheless important becasue they
stimulate new efforts and reinforce existing ones. NEPA was adopted as
U.S. national policy with little debate, but it produced far-reaching, if
ambiguous, changes in federal decision-making processes.2
To effectuate a policy of giving environmental concerns equal weight
with developmental ones, NEPA declares "a national policy which will
encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his envi-
ronment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to
the environment . . . and stimulate the health and welfare of man
.. ."" While this statute has influenced other countries, many Euro-
pean nations have been more cautious in according environmental protec-
tion equal status with the goals of economic development, because of the
problems inherent in their integration with the former.52 The economic
RONMENTAL HISTORY: THE EXPLOITATION AND CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES (1977).
48. This third stage, symbolized in the United States by the enactment of NEPA, is
"concerned with the so-called artificial environment of the cities and buildings as well as
with the natural world. It differs from the narrower interpretations of natural resources
policy in that its criteria are ecological rather than economic." Caldwell, supra note 45, at
85.
49. E.g., the former U.S. Atomic Energy Commission took the position prior to the en-
actment of NEPA that it lacked the necessary jurisdiction to consider the impact on water
quality of the nuclear plants it was licensing. See Tarlock, Balancing Environmental Con-
siderations and Energy Demands: A Comment on Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Committee,
Inc. v. AEC, 47 IND. L.J. 645, 648-52 (1972).
50. NEPA forced agencies to consider factors that had not previously been considered
and to reassess procedural and substantive decisions. Institutional responses vary among
and within agencies, of course, but the impact on many agencies was substantial. See R.
LIROFF, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: NEPA AND ITS AFTERMATH. (1976).
151 a U.S&C: § 321.
52. For a comparative analysis of environmental versus developmental goals, see L.J.
Lundquist, Clean Air Policies in the USA and Sweden: What Matters Most, Technology,
Economics or Politics? (Paper presented at American Political Science Association, Seattle,
Wash., 1979).
See also Wimmer, Environmental Law in Austria-the Position of April 1976, in Eu-
ROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 4, at 289-90, where it is argued:
The unsatisfactory situation of environmental protection in Austria results
not so much from the lack of law but from the fact that the existing laws are
only partially applied in practice. The reason for this ... stems from the fun-
damental problems of the structure of environmental law as a whole. This con-
sists primarily in the fact that the provisions concerning the environmental
embodied in the various administrative texts are not exclusively and entirely
VOL. 13:1
OVERVIEW OF COMPARATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
consequences of such a policy were quickly perceived by these nations
and thus, when they enacted their own comprehensive acts, a more ex-
plicit balance was struck. For example, the Swedish Environmental Pro-
tection Act of 1969, drafted so as not to handicap the international com-
petitive position of Swedish industry, simply does not state general future
goals.5 3 The German Program for the Protection of the Human Environ-
ment of 1971 was drafted after extensive deliberations by ten project
groups, including different economic groups." The Program, although in-
fluenced by the American model, merely states ten general goals, leaving
it to the several German states (Liinder) to choose between economic and
environmental priorities. The most explicit legislative decision to pit en-
vironmental enhancement against industrial development was found prior
to 1970 in the Japanese Basic Act for Environmental Pollution Control of
1967. The listed goals of the Act were to be harmonized with "sound eco-
nomic development." 5  In the U.S.S.R., environmental goals are recog-
nized by supplemental economic planning. GOSPLAN, the State Plan-
ning Committee, was directed in 1974 to include conservation indices and
plans in its long-term and annual plans, especially in the 25th Five Year
Plan (1976-80)."
B. Institutional Arrangements For Environmental Regulation
Legislative declarations of environmental policies are meaningless
without the creation of institutions to implement them. Such policies
generally require industries and public entities to invest considerable
sums of money in pollution abatement technologies or in the development
of less harmful products, or to modify their behavior otherwise in costly
ways. Prior to the last decade, government institutions in almost all coun-
tries had only fragmented authority to deal with problems now called en-
vironmental. Moreover, these institutions often lacked sufficient geo-
graphical authority to deal with the scope of pollution spillovers or
administrative authority to attempt any kind of comprehensive manage-
ment approach to the problem posed by even one source of pollution.
Thus, countries desiring to respond to environmental problems were then
devoted to environmental protection, but also must satisfy other interests for
which the administration is responsible, whether of a technical, financial or
economic nature.
53. S. Westerlund, The Legal Control of Land Use and Environmental Quality in Swe-
den, in EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 4, at 401.
54. W. MANGUN, THE PuBLic ADMINISTRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: A CoMEARA-
nvE ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES AND WEST GERMANY (1977).
55. This phrase was stricken in the December 1970 amendments to this legislation. For
a brief but useful discussion of the background of the 1970 legislation, see generally AIR
POLLUTION CONTROL IN JAPAN 22-24 (1972), prepared for the U.N. Conference on the Human
Environment.
56. See W.E. Butler, Environmental Law and Water Legislation in the Soviet Union
(Paper presented at the Conference on International Environmental Law, arranged by the
British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London, Sept. 1-3, 1973).
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and are today confronted with two sets of potential problems. First, a
choice must be made among modes of institutional reform. The available
choices are (1) expansion of existing regulatory jurisdictions, (2) coordina-
tion of existing jurisdictions through a central coordinating body, and (3)
creation of new management institutions. Second, the choice of institu-
tional design is further complicated by the physical nature of environ-
mental problems, which often calls for action from progressively higher
levels of government, generally at the national level. The increased cen-
tralization of regulatory functions, however, may well create stresses in
federal systems; even in unitary forms of government, such a trend may
be controversial. Notwithstanding these problems, the move from the sec-
ond to third stages of the Caldwell model is often signalled by the expan-
sion of existing regulatory authorities or the creation of new, national reg-
ulatory institutions.
When strong, centralized institutions already exist at the national
level, a country may be able to respond to the need for increased regula-
tion of public health-threatening activities by the jurisdictional expansion
of existing agencies. Sweden's experience exemplifies this manner of regu-
lation. 57 Jurisdictional expansion is especially successful when a regula-
tory authority with jurisdiction coterminous with a physical problem is
already in place. This situation exists in France, where six extant river
basin authorities (agences du bassin) were given the power to control pol-
lution. The agence concept has also been used as a model for bilateral
institutions to deal with the related environmental problems of impacted
areas such as river corridors."8
Often, there is an interim step between the expansion of the jurisdic-
tion of existing regulatory bodies and the creation of a new, often central-
ized body: that is, the coordination of existing jurisdictions. The policies
of the various governmental agencies in most countries have environmen-
tal consequences of one kind or another and some mechanism is needed
to harmonize the nation's environmental and non-environmental goals.
While diverse functions should naturally be coordinated, any coordina-
tion without the prior resolution of underlying value conflicts is meaning-
57. A Natural Conservancy Act (Naturvardslag) was enacted in 1964 primarily to pro-
tect the scientific and amenity value of the country's parks and coastline-an atypical late
conservation era policy. In 1969, Sweden initiated a technology-forcing pollution control
program. A licensing system was enacted and the executive functions were given to the Na-
ture Conservancy Agency, which was renamed the Environment Protection Board. The En-
vironment Protection Act (Miljoskyddstag) created a new, quasi-judicial body, the
Franchise Board (Koncessionamnd), to issue licenses, but the real power to implement the
purpose of the act, i.e., to exempt and vary the terms of licenses (dispens), remained with
the Environmental Protection Board. Sand, Sweden: Basic Laws and Institutions, FAO
LEGIS. STUD. No. 4 (1974). See also S. Westerlund, supra note 53, at 392.
A similar expansion of regulatory jurisdiction occurred in the Soviet Union. See W. E.
Butler, note 56 supra.
58. See A. Kiss & C. Lambrechts, Legal Protection of the Environment in
France-The Position at April 1976, in EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 4, at
324-27.
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less. A classic coordination scheme is illustrated by the powers given to
the federal Minister of the Interior in the Federal Republic of Germany.59
The United States and Japan illustrate the third option, the creation
of new regulatory institutions. In 1971, the two countries more or less
simultaneously decided to create new environmental protection agencies.
At the federal level in the United States, responsibility for environmental
functions had previously been scattered among many government agen-
cies. For example, responsibility for air and water pollution was split be-
tween two Cabinet departments: Interior; and Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW). Allegations were made that some departments (such as
HEW) with jurisdiction over air pollution, but not over water pollution,
ranked air pollution abatement low on their list of priorities. In other
cases, the fundamental mission of the agency was simply inconsistent
with environmental regulation." As a consequence of the foregoing, a new
executive agency, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), was es-
tablished, which was neither a part of the Cabinet nor an independent
regulatory commission. Following the recommendations that agencies
with direct control over business conduct be administered by single ad-
ministrators with significantly reduced judicial authority, the EPA is di-
rected by a single administrator appointed by the President and directly
responsible to him."1 The hope was that the agency would be the vehicle
by which a clear and consistent executive environmental policy could be
executed. 62
C. General Forms of Environmental And Public Health Regulation
In most industrialized countries, regulation is the preferred method
of pollution control and public health protection. From an administrative
perspective, as opposed to an economic efficiency perspective, regulation
is often the least costly means of emission reduction and of behavior and
product modification strategy. Regulation allows uniform standards to be
formulated at relatively high levels of governmental decision-making. It
has also been suggested that regulation is popular with governments be-
cause the creation of new entities and the enactment of new standards of
conduct constitute the fastest ways of convincing an electorate that the
59. See H. STEIGER & 0. KIMMINICH, THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO POLLUTION IN
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1976).
60. Environmentalists argued that the Department of Agriculture could not evaluate
the safety of chemical pesticides having substantial production benefits because of its mis-
sion to promote food production. See Rodgers, The Persistent Problem of the Persistent
Pesticides: A Lesson in Environmental Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 567 (1970).
61. President's Advisory Council on Executive Reorganization, A New Regulatory
Framework: Report on Selected Independent Regulatory Agencies (1971).
62. Japan undertook a similar consolidation of specialized environmental programs to
create the National Environmental Agency in 1971. Unlike the American system, the agency
head is a ministerial appointment-the Minister of State for Environmental Affairs. See Y.
NOMURA, THE CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN'S ANTI-POLLUTION LAWS (1976).
1983
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
government is responding to a "crisis."
At the outset, two fundamental choices must be made with respect to
any regulatory program. First, it must be decided whether emission stan-
dards will be based on the desired quality of the individual receiving me-
dium, such as an airshed or river basin, or whether the standards will be
based on the source of the emission. The first generation of pollution con-
trol programs often relied on receiving media standards, because emission
reduction was seen as a rational resource allocation problem similar to the
conservation of renewable and non-renewable resources. Second genera-
tion programs, as the widely studied and copied U.S. experience illus-
trates, often shift their basis to emission source standards." It has proved
very difficult, as a practical matter, to work backwards from general me-
dia quality standards to individual emissions in order to enforce source
standards against polluters. Governments have found it far easier to spec-
ify the allowable chemical contents of drainage pipe, smokestack, and in-
dustrial process effluents and the technologies which must be used to
achieve these results, and then to require that identifiable sources of
emission apply for some type of permit."
After the issue of receiving-media quality versus source-of-emission
standards is resolved, a choice between performance and specification
standards must be made." In practice, many pollution abatement and
control programs apply performance and specification standards simulta-
neously.6 7 Countries which desire significant pollution reduction often
seek performance goals through technology-forcing standards which spec-
ify increasingly sophisticated emission control technology by legislatively-
or administratively-set deadlines. This is a popular method of controlling
automobile pollution inasmuch as the concentrated nature of the industry
facilitates the establishment of uniform engine-design standards to meet
a performance goal.68
Pollution reduction standards are generally set to achieve one of
three goals: immediate public health protection, general welfare enhance-
63. J. KRIER & E. URSIN, POLLUTION AND PoLIcY 263-77 (1977).
64. The Federal Republic of Germany requires the use of emission limitation equip-
ment reflecting the state of the art. BundesImmissionsschutzgesetz [BIMSchG] 5 § 2. The
statute is described in Currie, Air Pollution in West Germany, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 355
(1982).
65. Currie, supra note 64, at 356-58.
66. Performance standards allow polluters to act as they wish, so long as their
emissions do not exceed specified limits for particular pollutants... and speci-
fication standards decree not what goal must be accomplished but how it must
be accomplished. Most commonly they require pollution control equipment
which meets certain design requirements ....
Krier, The Pollution Problem and Legal Institutions: A Conceptual Overview, 18 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 429, 463-64 (1971).
67. E.g., The Belgian Act of March 26, 1971 on the Protection of Surface Waters, re-
printed in EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 4, at 29.
68. See Currie, The Mobile Source Provisions of the Clean Air Act, 46 U. CHI. L. REV.
811 (1979).
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ment, or public health and safety risk minimization. Standards often at-
tempt to promote these goals simultaneously, but it is useful to distin-
guish among them because the distribution of costs and benefits
associated with attaining each may be radically different. Each goal either
takes the form of a statement of general objectives or precise numerical
limitations on the amount of pollutants that can be discharged over time.
Whatever the goal, standards must initially rest on a foundation of scien-
tific data, the first step of which is the development of common scientific
criteria and methodologies for measuring pollution damage and setting
emission reduction regulations.6 9 However, environmental standards can-
not ultimately rest on scientific criteria alone; the uncertainties surround-
ing the effects of various discharges on receiving media and those persons
exposed to such media remain too great. As a result, any standard
adopted ultimately reflects a value judgment about the degree of risk
minimization to be afforded society.
Public health protection standards are designed to protect the public
from known, immediate health and crop threats. Administrators are gen-
erally directed to base the standards on existing scientific knowledge of
cause and effect relationships between exposure to a particular pollutant
and resulting damage to health or crops. Because of the uncertainty of
scientific knowledge in many countries, the standards are conservative in
that "margins of safety" are included to protect the public from potential
underestimates of the harmful effects of pollutants. Nonetheless, public
health standards are still limited to the protection from serious harm of
people and the flora and fauna useful to them. Pollution which causes
aesthetic damage in the form of visibility impairment or historic building
decay, for example, is often excluded from this calculus.
However, the United States and other countries have adopted sec-
ondary standards to address this problem. Whereas under the Clean Air
Act primary standards are aimed at public health protection, secondary
standards, which in some cases may be more stringent, are aimed at
broader "general welfare" effects such as visibility impairment.70 These
latter standards are especially controversial because the causal link be-
tween emission and harm is more speculative and thus the ratio of quan-
tifiable benefits gained compared to the costs of achievement may be
small.
71
The third goal of standards is to protect the public from long-term,
low probability, yet high-cost risks of health impairment. Unfortunately,
the kinds of controls that are effective for smoke reduction do not neces-
sarily work for substances such as pesticides, toxic chemicals, and hazard-
69. See S. JOHNSON, THE POLLUTION CONTROL POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
(1979).
70. W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 227 (1977).
71. See B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR OR How THE CLEAN AIR
ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION DOLLAR BAILOUT FOR HIGH SULPHUR COAL PRODUCERS AND
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT (1981).
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ous wastes. These latter are diffused into the environment in ways that
make it impossible to trace causal relationships between exposure and
harm. As such, science can only demonstrate that various risk levels of
future harm are thereby created. 72 These risk levels are intensely contro-
versial because of the regulatory consequences of standards designed to
minimize long-term, low probability risks.73 There is increasing recogni-
tion that because toxic pollutants are inorganic and tend to concentrate
in food chains, such chemicals differ from conventional organic pollu-
tants. To protect the public from the health hazards associated with toxic
pollutants, the burden is increasingly being placed on those who seek the
benefits of a chemical to prove its safety.7 Further, discharge and use
limitations need not be restricted by the current findings of scientific re-
search; rather, regulators may deal with uncertainty by establishing stan-
dards with wide margins of safety.
75
As noted above, any pollution control strategy must make an initial
choice between reliance on the assimilative capacity of the receiving me-
dia and the application of technology to eliminate the alleged harmful
effects of the discharges. Prior to the worldwide recognition of the harm-
ful consequences of pollution, use of the assimilative capacities of air-,
water- and landsheds was the primary means of waste disposal, and this
strategy is still often followed in developing nations, if only by default.
Reaction against the social costs of the overuse of free goods has led to
the adoption of the "polluter pays" principle, based on the ambiguous
notion that the discharger is responsible for all costs of his activity,7 and
consequently to a rejection of the assimilative capacity of receiving media
as the primary pollution control strategy. However, such capacity is still a
factor to be considered in setting technology-based standards for individ-
ual discharges (which generally are used to force the internalization of
external costs by the polluters). The quality of the receiving media is also
considered in designing laws to influence the location of industrial
processes and other polluting activities. Where an activity is located may
not only determine the degree of pollution hazard that it poses but may
influence the cost of emissions-reduction as well.77
72. The problem of agency ability to do more than specify potential risks within a wide
range of probability is discussed in Latin, The "Significance" of Toxic Health Risks: An
Essay on Legal Deciqinnmaking Under Uncertainty. 10 ECOLOGY L.J. 339 (1982).
73. See W. LOWRANCE, ON ACCEPTABLE RISK (1976).
74. The shift of the burden of proof is the result of many statutory changes and more
subtle changes in administrative attitudes. The idea has received formal legal recognition in
the United States in a series of cases holding that the EPA need not prove that a substance
is harmful in order to limit substantially its use and discharge; the agency's decisions need
only rest on respectable, even though disputed, scientific evidence. See, e.g., Envtl. Defense
Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 82-83 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
75. An important U.S. judicial decision establishing this principle is Ethyl Corp. v.
EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
76. For a concise discussion of the ambiguities in cost assessment, see S. Ercman, supra
note 4, at 489.
77. See D. MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND USE CONTROLS LEGISLATION 169-221
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Pollution reduction planning throughout the world often consists of
the designation of pristine or relatively clean areas, where new industrial
development and other polluting activities are discouraged, and the desig-
nation of relatively dirty areas, where stringent, technology-forcing stan-
dards or other pollution reduction strategies, such as fuel substitution,
apply."'
Some types of pollution which threaten public health may be mini-
mized simply by locating the polluting activity in a place where the as-
similative capacity of an air-, water- or landshed can deal effectively with
the pollution, thus consuming rather than conserving clean media. This
theory, however, "has no validity at all for synthetics like petrochemicals,
to say nothing of radionucleides. . . .[T]here is little or no safe assimila-
tive capacity for such unnatural compounds. ' 7 9 Land use planning pro-
grams are the primary means of implementing such a consumption strat-
egy: basically, industry is steered to geographic areas of the country
where the receiving media are able to minimize the impacts of pollution,
so that already overloaded media elsewhere will not be further stressed.
Of course, such planning often conflicts with other environmental goals
which seek to preserve environmentally sensitive areas from
degradation.80
Environmental planning encompasses a number of functions, which
include the making of background assessments, the measurement of ex-
isting pollution levels and the likely impact of regulatory measures. There
(1976).
78. In the United States, regulations have been enacted to preserve the air quality of
relatively pristine areas such as national parks and Indian reservations. Excessively dirty
areas are designated as non-attainment areas, i.e., areas where the primary and secondary
standards cannot be met, and stringent limitations are placed on the construction of new
pollutant-emitting facilities. See Currie, Nondegradation and Visibility Under the Clean
Air Act, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 51 (1980).
Pursuant to EEC recommendations, Belgium has designated its heavy industrial con-
centrations as special protection areas for the purposes of imposing special controls. Royal
Order of 26 July 1971, MB (Belg.), No. 150, at 9258 (5 Aug. 1974).
Bulgaria has established a special program for the capital city of Sofia and various in-
dustrial areas, which provides for air quality monitoring, the installation of filters and other
purification devices, and the substitution of natural gas for oil. Decree on the Sanitary Clas-
sification of Industrial Activities and the Minimum Health Protection Areas of 13 Feb. 1970,
Dz V (Bulgaria), at 3.
79. W. OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARcrrY 81 (1977).
80. The problems of implementing such programs are illustrated by the Swedish expe-
rience. Since 1966, Sweden has undertaken "National Physical Planning" to determine the
areas where major industrialization is likely to stress valuable ecological resources. While
the government lacks the power to compel an industry to locate in a place which is consis-
tent with national planning objectives, three coastal regions have nonetheless been with-
drawn from development. Lundquist, Sweden's National Physical Planning for Resources
Management, 2 ENvTL. AFF. 487, 496-98 (1972). While industrial growth is encouraged
outside of existing major metropolitan areas to promote equal regional development, this
goal conflicts with a concentration policy which dictates that, insofar as it is compatible with
the regional dispersion policy, new polluting industries should be concentrated in already
industrialized regions.
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has been widespread dissatisfaction with single resource or single pollu-
tion source planning and consequently, in the past decade, there have
been ambitious, though largely futile, attempts to mandate holistic, ra-
tional environmental planning. In 1970, the United States attempted to
mandate formal national planning procedures for all federal activities
which have a significant environmental impact. These procedures in-
cluded consideration of all likely impacts of these activities and mitiga-
tion possibilities with respect thereto, and even study of a no action alter-
native."' Because of the gap, under NEPA, between the costs of
compliance and the environmental benefits received and the fact that
mandatory planning leaves administrators no discretion to concentrate
their resources on truly significant issues, among other reasons, most
countries which have examined the U.S. experience have been reluctant
to adopt the American model fully. 2 However, environmental assessment
exists in various countries by administrative decree, and in Japan a trial
court has held that the civil tort law allows plaintiffs affected by the
health hazards of a lake development project to require the government
to prepare an environmental assessment of the project and consult with
interested citizens.
8 3
Inorganic chemical products and wastes are often toxic, and all radio-
active materials present possible health hazards if not carefully managed.
Toxic substances are generally defined as wastes from chemical and other
manufacturing processes, and products which present serious, often unas-
certainable health and other environmental hazards, even when used for
their intended purposes. Increasingly, nations and international organiza-
tions subject toxic substances to special regulation. Regulatory regimes in
industrialized countries share the following common features: (1) a regu-
latory authority with the power to screen products for health hazards
before they reach the marketplace;8 (2) governmental authority to re-
81. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 43 U.S.C. §§ 4331, 4335, 4341, 4342, &
4344. The duty to study no-action alternatives was first announced in Nat. Defense Council,
Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Morton was trimmed in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), but the duty to study no action alternatives remains
quite strict. See State of California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982).
82. See generally, 2 INT'L ENVTL. REP. 651 (1979).
83. Upham. After Minamata: Current Prospects and Problems in Japanese Environ-
mental Litigation, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 213 (1979).
84. In Sweden, the government has been allowed since 1973 to control the manufacture,
import, trade, and use of poisons and other dangerous products. See S. Westerlund, supra
note 53, at 392.
In the United States, the authority to screen pesticides is conferred by the Environmen-
tal Pest Control Act of 1972, 7 U.S.C. § 135 (1970), as amended 7 U.S.C. § 136 (Supp. IV
1980). In 1976, the EPA was given the power to screen all potentially toxic products in
advance of their manufacture. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976).
For a discussion of pre-market screening of hazardous products, see COUNCIL ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY-10TH ANNUAL REPORT 215-21 (1979).
In June 1980, OECD nations reached agreement on pre-market data and testing re-
quirements for toxic substances, which the EPA plans to integrate into its rules for pre-
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quire testing protocols involving the use of laboratory animals, on which
inferences that a substance is potentially harmful may be based in lieu of
epidemiological evidence; (3) authority to base conclusions about sub-
stance safety on risk-benefit analyses;"5 (4) the shifting of the burden of
proving a substance unsafe away from the governmental authority be-
cause of the often inconclusive nature of the evidence about public health
hazards;86 and (5) the requirement of stringent management practices for
toxic and other hazardous wastes as the only way to balance the interests
of industrial development and public safety in modern economies that
require the use of many dangerous substances. Management options in-
clude recycling, storage, disposal, and treatment to alter the chemical
content of the substance. Disposal practices are being tightened in many
countries, more attention is being paid to the siting of hazardous waste
management facilities8 7 and incentives are being provided for recycling
action.
D. Alternatives to Regulation
Two powerful charges have been directed at regulatory programs
based on across-the-board standards. First, standards often require re-
ductions in emissions which cannot be economically justified in terms of
the emissions' social costs. Second, uniform standards are an inefficient
means of achieving administratively-mandated pollution reduction levels
because they do not encourage the least costly method of emission reduc-
tion.88 In fact, such standards can work to lock industries into using inef-
ficient technologies. Two alternative methods of emission reduction have
been proposed to cure these deficiencies and at the same time protect the
public from environmental harm: pricing mechanisms and subsidies. Pric-
ing mechanisms take the form of charges or taxes on the amounts of
waste disposed. The theory behind this strategy is that the more the pol-
luter is charged, the greater his incentive to reduce the amount of his
market notification by American industries. See Note, Control of Toxic Substances: The
Attempt to Harmonize the Notification Requirements of the U.S. Toxic Substances Con-
trol Act and the European Community Sixth Amendment, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 417 (1980).
85. Such authority is required because of the great difficulties in determining whether
and how a substance will actually cause harm to whom and at what time. A risk-benefit
analysis substitutes state-of-the-art evidence about possible future harms for traditional
concepts of cause-in-fact and immediate personal injury.
86. The Swedish hazardous products law expressly provides that public officials do not
bear the burden of proving a product dangerous. See S. Westerlund, supra note 53, at 411.
In the United States, the courts have approved the use of sensitive evidentiary triggers
to allow the government to ban a substance from the market and shift the burden of proving
its safety to the manufacturer. See Envtl. Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998, 1004
(D.C. Cir. 1976) and Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 106 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
87. See SITING NoN-RADIOAcTIvE HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILITIES: AN OVER-
viEw, FINAL REPORT OF THE FIRST KEYSTONE WORKSHOP ON MANAGING NON-RADIOACTIVE
HAZARDOUS WASTES (1980).
88. See Krier, The Irrational National Air Quality Standards: Macro- and Micro-Mis-
takes, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 323 (1974).
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waste discharges and to do so efficiently.8 9 On the other hand, subsidies
can take the form of either tax incentives or direct government payments
for the construction of abatement facilities.
The United States has made use of these strategies only sparingly,
preferring to try to correct the economic inefficiencies which allegedly re-
sult from its standards. This has been done through assorted variance
procedures applied on a case-by-case basis and through flexibility devices
such as "bubbles."90 In France and the Federal Republic of Germany,
however, where pollution control is more integrated with industrial devel-
opment planning than in the United States, there has been much more
widespread use of charges and subsidies.9
In deciding whether to adopt a pricing strategy, it is important for a
country to distinguish between the two uses of charge systems. In the first
instance, those polluters who fail to comply with applicable effluent or
emissions standards may be subject to criminal fines. The payment of
such fines, however, often costs less than implementing any serious pro-
gram aimed at reducing the pollution. To prevent the creation of a low
cost right to pollute, many countries have moved to set higher fines to
encourage compliance.92 This theory of charges, though, still relegates
such penalties to the role of backstop for emission level standards. In the
second instance, many economists who have studied environmental
problems urge that pollution charges be used as the primary rather than
the secondary or tertiary method of reducing unwanted discharges.9 " It is
posited that an entity with functional geographic boundaries and the ca-
pabilities of treating wastes and imposing charges on dischargers will
force public entities and private industry alike to consider waste disposal
costs and pollution control technology in choosing product mixes and
plant locations. The expected result would be a reduction in emissions to
more efficient levels. Various models based on the water management as-
sociations (Genossenschaften) operating in the Ruhr region of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany have been proposed.9
Many environmentalists are suspicious of effluent charges and taxes
89. A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZ, POLLUTION, PRICES AND PUBLIC POLICY (1975).
90. The EPA allows operators of a single plant or plants in close proximity to one an-
other to treat an entire complex, as opposed to its component parts, as a single source of
emissions. All emission sources are thus put under a "bubble" for the purpose of allowing
tradeoffs, i.e., a reduction in the emission levels of certain pollutants in exchange for higher
allowable levels for others.
91. A. Kiss & C. Lambrechts, supra note 58, at 324.
92. E.g., factory managers in the Soviet Union may be deprived of bonuses which re-
present fully half of their personal income. Louchs, Water Quality Management in the So-
viet Union, 1977 J. WATER POLLUTION CONTROL FED'N 176-78.
93. See, e.g., J. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRICES (1968) for an influential early
statement of this position.
94. See F. ANDERSON, A. KNEBSE, P. REED, R. STEVENSON & S. TAYLOR, ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES (1977) and A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, MANAG-
ING WATER QUALITY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY, INSTITUTIONS (1968).
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on the ground that such schemes will only legitimize generous rights to
pollute. This argument has influenced the widespread governmental pref-
erernce for licensing regulation95 with the result that a different use has, in
recent years, been made of the taxing power from that advocated by
economists. Environmental disasters, such as oil spills and the abandoned
hazardous chemical waste site at Love Canal in Niagara Falls, New York,
often leave large property and health losses uncompensated. Liability
standards are often unclear, though there is a general global trend toward
the adoption of strict liability for environmental accidents," and the
problems of proving that a given entity caused the harm inflicted are for-
midable. One variant of the "polluter pays" principle requires the indus-
try reaping the benefits of activities that pose high risks of environmental
damage to bear the collective responsibility for those accidents which are
seemingly inevitable. Industrywide responsibility is fixed by taxes im-
posed on the risk-causing activities-for example, the levy of a certain
charge for each barrel of oil unloaded at a port. Such taxes inflate a fund
upon which governments (and sometimes private individuals) may draw
for cleanup and damage costs in the event of an accident. 7 Industry gen-
erally argues that since society as a whole benefits from its high-risk ac-
tivities, responsibility ought thus to be borne by all citizens, or at least
shared, and indeed, some funds are supported by activity taxes and gen-
eral tax revenues.98 In addition to their use in compensating victims of
environmental disasters, such funds, especially those with strict liability
rules, may have a beneficial deterrent effect against loose risk-manage-
ment practices.
As environmental quality goals have increased in number and strict-
ness, governments have had to cooperate with public and private entities
to induce the construction and use of treatment facilities. Such coopera-
tion of state and private enterprises has been facilitated through grants
from various levels of government and resource management authori-
ties.99 Subsidies are usually granted through legislation, although the
French water basin agencies grant them through private arrangements as
well. 100 The United States has established a substantial, though chroni-
cally underfunded, federal grant system for the construction of municipal
95. See Latin, Environmental Deregulation and Consumer Decisionmaking Under Un-
certainty, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 187, 236 (1982).
96. S. Ercman, supra note 4, at 488.
97. Maine Oil Discharge Prevention and Pollution Control Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 38, §§ 541-57 (Supp. 1981).
98. See generally J. McLAUGHLIN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO POLLUTION
CONTROL IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 508 (1976).
99. A. Kiss & G. Lambrechts, note 58 supra.
100. An exception to the use of general legislation or subsidies granted by the central
government is the Japanese concept of administrative contracts between local governments
and private industry. See Sand, Legal Systems for Environmental Protection: Japan, Swe-
den, United States, FAO LEGIS. STUD. No. 4 (1974).
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waste treatment facilities."' Other countries provide special depreciation
rules in their tax laws for the installation of pollution abatement equip-
ment by private firms.
1 0 2
VI. CONCLUSIONS
At the risk of overgeneralization, a country's political structure and
legal system should incorporate three essential features in order to pro-
mote effective protection against environmental hazards. First, an arm of
the central government, whether in the context of a federal or unitary
system, should have an exclusive mandate to promote environmental
goals. At least for the foreseeable future, it will not be sufficient to merely
decree that all governmental agencies shall consider environmental values
in executing their missions. Second, this arm of government must have
delegated to it the power to decide how pollution costs are to be allocated
as between public and private entities. In most countries, this translates
into the ability to license discharges or mandate what fuels, chemicals,
and other necessary inputs to industrial processes may be used and under
what conditions. While it might be argued that these "structural" solu-
tions should be accompanied by strong mechanisms to allow the public
and the courts to serve as watchdogs of the regulators, the problem of
insufficient diligence in the promotion of environmental goals, as serious
as it is, is less important than achieving the third feature of an effective
system for environmental protection. Although an exclusive mandate to
promote environmental values is necessary, at some point the protection
of those values must become integrated into the country's general policy-
making processes, which is the third essential feature. Otherwise, policies
protective of the public health and the earth's fragile life support systems
will remain too vulnerable to pressures that they be ignored or made less
restrictive. The integration of such values requires that regulatory agen-
cies have the flexibility to vary the degree of emission reduction and sub-
stance use they require, according to the severity of the situation. Where
toxic chemicals and radioactive wastes are concerned, severe restrictions
may be in order regardless of the costs of regulation. In some instances,
however, it may be useful merely to create standards based on a state of
the art cost-benefit analysis, while charges, taxes, or post-occurrence com-
pensation may in other situations be the most effective remedy for public
health protection.
101. Id.
102. See Thiem, Environmental Law in the Federal Republic of Germany-The Posi-
tion at April 1976, in EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 4, at 362.
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